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ABSTRACT—Many members of tribal nations hold assets in pension plans
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
When a tribal member with such a plan divorces, the plan must be divided
between the former spouses according to a marital-asset division order
issued pursuant to state law. A 2011 Department of Labor Advisory
Opinion opined that this order must be issued either by a state court or a
tribal court in a state that recognizes such orders as state law. This Note
argues that this Advisory Opinion is flawed. ERISA simply requires an
application of a specific body of law; it says nothing restricting the forum
to state courts. Many tribal judiciaries have available to them choice of law
statutes, and the martial-asset division orders they issue pursuant to state
law should be honored. This is a matter of convenience for the tribal
member and a matter of a tribe’s sovereignty to order its own internal
domestic relations as it sees fit.
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INTRODUCTION
Divorce is common in the United States.1 A divorcing couple must
divide up their marital assets,2 including any pension plans.3 While divorce
proceedings can present complex legal issues for most divorcees, the issues
facing members of the various tribal nations of the United States are
especially daunting; this is particularly true when either divorcee has an
employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),4 a federal law governing pension plans in private
industries.5 In tribal nations, ERISA is applicable to private employers as
well as to some public employers.6 While the law does not force an
employer to provide a pension plan, if the employer does choose to do so,

1

See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2013).
2
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).
3
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 562–63 (Cal. 1976) (holding that pension plans
are subject to division in divorce proceedings).
4
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
5
Id. § 1003(a).
6
See id. (stating that aside from certain exceptions, ERISA applies to “any employee benefit” that
is “established or maintained” by an employer or employee organization “engaged in” or “affecting
commerce”).
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the plan is governed by ERISA.7 The process of dividing ERISA-governed
pension plans is more complex for tribal members than nontribal citizens
because ERISA administrators are instructed not to accept marital-asset
division orders issued by tribal courts.8 Currently, tribal members must go
to state courts for redress.9
ERISA contemplates a judicial role in dividing pension plans upon
divorce. Section 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) mandates that the division of the
marital assets must be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”10
ERISA defines “State” as including “any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone.”11 Upon first reading, ERISA
seems to suggest that administrators of ERISA-governed pension plans
cannot accept a tribal court’s marital-asset division order. Indeed, in the
absence of case law directly on this issue, a Department of Labor (DOL)
Advisory Opinion came to this very conclusion.12 The opinion is not
binding on courts, but until the issue is litigated and a court finds to the
contrary, at least some (and likely all) ERISA pension plan administrators
will follow this interpretation.13 This presents important ramifications for
tribal members and the degree of sovereignty tribal nations enjoy. This
Note explores these issues, arguing that the current situation, in which
ERISA pension plan administrators are instructed not to honor domestic
relations orders issued by tribal courts, is antithetical to a large body of
jurisprudence dealing with the application of neutral, generally applicable
laws to tribal nations. Furthermore, this Note argues that the plain language
of ERISA already requires pension plan administrators to honor tribal
courts’ marital-asset division orders, so long as the applicable tribal law has
a choice of law provision permitting the use of state law where appropriate,
and the tribal court applies the state law in issuing the order.
Policy considerations concerning the sovereignty of tribal nations also
weigh in favor of requiring ERISA administrators to honor tribal court
division orders. The enforceability of the tribal orders is more than a matter
7

See id.
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter No. 2011-03A (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Department of
Labor 2011 Opinion Letter], available at 2011 WL 585771, at *3.
9
See id. at *2 (noting that although ERISA only requires a “proper final order of any State
authority” that “[f]ederal law . . . does not generally treat Indian tribes as States, or as agencies or
instrumentalities of States”). This is problematic because tribal courts traditionally adjudicate the
domestic affairs of their members. See Alicia K. Crawford, Comment, The Evolution of the
Applicability of ERISA to Indian Tribes: We May Finally Have Congressional Intent, but It’s Still
Flawed, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 259, 266 (2010).
10
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
11
Id. § 1002(10).
12
See Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8.
13
It is unknown to the author the number of pension plan administrators that have followed this
Advisory Opinion.
8
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of convenience for tribal members: if ERISA plan administrators cannot
honor tribal court domestic relations orders, tribal members seeking
marital-asset division upon divorce will be forced to go to state courts to
divide pension plans.14 However, state courts do not have the same
understanding of tribal history and customs as tribal courts.15 Furthermore,
removing issues customarily decided by tribal courts to state courts
jeopardizes the sovereignty of tribal nations and counteracts current trends
in federal policy toward tribal nations.16
Part I presents a brief overview of ERISA and the Pension Protection
Act of 2006,17 which amended ERISA. Part II examines the applicability of
federal legislation to tribal nations. In particular, it reviews the conflicting
case law from and between the Supreme Court and circuit courts of
appeals. Part III discusses the applicability of ERISA to tribal nations in
light of conflicting circuit court jurisprudence and congressional intent.
Part IV explores the ambiguity in ERISA’s § 1056 regarding whether
pension plan administrators are permitted to honor domestic relations
orders created by tribal courts. It reviews the DOL’s nonbinding Advisory
Opinion on the matter and presents a contrasting plain-language argument
that allows plan administrators to implement tribal courts’ orders. Part V
examines the policy considerations that weigh in favor of allowing ERISA
administrators to honor tribal court domestic relations orders. Finally,
Part VI makes legislative and judicial recommendations to disambiguate
the situation.
I. BACKGROUND: ERISA AND THE 2006 AMENDMENT
Congress passed and President Gerald Ford signed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974.18 ERISA was enacted
after multiple incidents in which employees were unable to collect their
pension benefits because private employers had underfunded their pension
plans.19 Although ERISA does not mandate that private employers provide
14

See Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2.
See generally, e.g., Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping: Technology and Traditional Indian
Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 95 (1997) (outlining the Navajo peacemaking justice system).
16
See DENIS BINDER ET AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 242
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (quoting Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings Cnty., 532 F.2d
655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)).
17
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
18
Adam B. Garner, Note, Protecting the ERISA Whistleblower: The Reach of Section 510 of
ERISA, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 239 (2011).
19
See We Work for the Employees, L. OFFS. ARCHIBALD J. THOMAS, III, P.A., http://www.jobrights.com/erisa.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). See generally James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious
Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packer Corporation and the Origins of ERISA,
49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) (discussing how the 1963 Studebaker plant shutdown served as the
impetus for the pension reform of the next decade culminating in ERISA).
15
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pension plans, ERISA governs those pension plans that private employers
choose to provide.20 The law sets minimum funding levels for pension
plans21 and requires for the vesting of benefits after a certain period of
time.22 It also creates the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to
pay pension benefits to employees in the event their employers terminate
their plans.23 ERISA explicitly preempts most state laws relating to pension
plans,24 although it does exclude government plans at all levels from its
ambit.25
Since enactment in 1974, Congress has amended ERISA numerous
times. Particularly relevant to tribal nations is the Pension Protection Act of
2006.26 Generally, the Pension Protection Act requires companies to make
higher premium payments to the PBGC when their pension plans are
underfunded.27 Of import to tribal nations is a minor change in the
definition of “governmental plan.”28 The amendment added language to the
definition expressly exempting from ERISA plans “established and
maintained by an Indian tribal government” for employees pursuing
essential government functions.29 The significance of this amendment will
be discussed infra in Part III.
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LAW TO TRIBAL NATIONS
The legal status of tribal nations has long been somewhat amorphous.30
Over the course of United States history, the judiciary’s formulation of the
legal relationship between tribal nations and state and federal governments
has undergone a substantial change. Courts over time have incrementally
recast tribal nations as another local- or state-level jurisdiction,31 as
opposed to a fully sovereign nation. The changing conception of the legal
status of tribal nations complicates the inquiry into the applicability of
federal and state law. This Part briefly examines the trajectory of the
application of federal legislation to tribal nations.
20

29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006).
Id. § 1082.
22
Id. § 1053.
23
Id. §§ 1301–1381.
24
Id. § 1144.
25
Id. § 1003(b)(1); see also Crawford, supra note 9, at 263.
26
Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051–52 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(32)).
27
Id. §§ 101–102, 120 Stat. at 784–809 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1086).
28
29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).
29
120 Stat. at 1051 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)
(stating that ERISA shall not cover “governmental plan[s]”).
30
See generally Robert W. Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 OR. L. REV. 193
(1959) (discussing the evolution of the legal status of tribal nations).
31
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (1994) (making it a crime to cross state or tribal borders when
committing an act of domestic violence).
21
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A. What Are Tribal Nations, Legally Speaking?
From the founding of the United States, Native American tribes have
been conceived of as unique entities. The United States Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”32 The Constitution
thereby distinguishes tribal nations from both foreign nations and American
states.
In 1831, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,33 the Supreme Court held that
it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Cherokee Nation was
neither a foreign nation nor a state.34 Article III of the U.S. Constitution
describes the judicial power to decide cases, limiting the power to
“Controversies . . . between two or more States[,] . . . between a State and
Citizens of another State[,] . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”35 Absent one of these party
alignments (or other conditions,36 omitted here, and clearly not applicable
to tribal nations), federal courts do not have jurisdiction.37 The Court
characterized the Cherokee Nation as a “domestic dependent nation[]”
whose “relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.”38 It further noted that tribal nations only possess limited features
of sovereignty, subject to the “dominion of the United States.”39
Specifically, treaties between the United States and tribal nations set aside
tracts of lands within U.S. territory, and sometimes within U.S. states, as
“reservations” for Native American tribes.40
The level of Native American sovereignty over these reservations has
settled somewhere between the complete sovereignty of an independent
nation and a state’s plenary power within a smaller sphere of activities.41
Tribes manage their reservations, but their sovereignty is far from
absolute—in fact, it is “subject to complete defeasance”42 by Congress.

32

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
34
Id. at 16–17, 30.
35
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36
There are other limitations to the judiciary’s power to hear cases. This excerpt is the part relevant
to tribal nations.
37
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
39
Id.
40
See, e.g., NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN–WHITE RELATIONS FROM
PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492–2000 (Peter Nabokov ed., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1999) (1978)
(discussing the use of treaty making to remove tribal nations from lands desired by the United States).
41
See, e.g., NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
tribal nation had power to adopt right to work ordinance).
42
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985). This statement
was fairly well established at this time. Since the mid-1800s, the Court has incrementally extended
33
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Thus, when Congress passes neutral, generally applicable legislation that
does not explicitly mention its applicability in tribal nations, the judiciary
must interpret whether and the extent to which that legislation should be
applied within tribal territory.43 In determining whether federal legislation
is applicable in tribal nations, the judiciary is the entity that determines the
degree of sovereignty the tribal nation is to enjoy vis-à-vis that legislation’s
field. So what are tribal nations, legally speaking? The answer depends on
the context, and the most that can be said is that they are unique entities,
subordinated at times to the will of Congress, and subject to ever-changing
constraints according to the popular ideas of the time.
B. Conflicting Case Law
The Supreme Court stated in 1921 that “[i]t is thoroughly established
that Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal
relations.”44 But the ability of Congress to assert such power does not imply
Congress intends all legislation it passes to impinge upon tribal authority.45
Currently, some confusion exists in this area of law.46 Since 1960, many
courts have followed what is known as the Tuscarora rule,47 but lower
courts are increasingly more likely to apply canons of statutory
construction embodied in recent Supreme Court cases.
1. The Tuscarora Rule and Coeur d’Alene Exceptions.—Despite its
modest beginnings, Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation48 exerts major influence regarding the applicability of federal
statutes to tribal nations. Decided in 1960, its rather mundane holding—
that reservation lands held in fee simple by a tribe are not part of a
reservation for purposes of the Federal Power Act49—belies its subsequent
widespread application.50 In what has been characterized as “dicta”51 or

federal and state power over tribal nations, such that by 1980 tribal self-government was thought to
depend upon legislative grants. See Rice v. Rhener, 463 U.S. 713, 717–20 (1983).
43
E.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–39 (1986).
44
Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391–92 (1921) (citing Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 310–
16 (1911); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903)).
45
E.g., Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (stating that “presumably such power will be exercised only when
circumstances arise which . . . may demand . . . that [Congress] should do so” (quoting Lone Wolf, 187
U.S. at 566)).
46
For a discussion of this and predictions about future jurisprudence, see Bryan H. Wildenthal,
How the Ninth Circuit Overruled a Century of Supreme Court Indian Jurisprudence—and Has So Far
Gotten Away with It, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 547, 586–90.
47
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 115. The Federal Power Act provides for, among other things, federal regulation over and
administrative coordination for the construction and maintenance of hydroelectric facilities. See 16
U.S.C. § 797 (2012).
50
See, e.g., Wildenthal, supra note 46, at 551 (discussing the scope of the Tuscarora rule).
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“likely dictum,”52 the Supreme Court called it “well settled” that “a general
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests.”53 The Tuscarora rule broke from the traditional canons of
statutory construction54 in expressing the presumption that a neutral,
generally applicable law that is silent as to its applicability to tribal nations
is to be applied to such entities. To many observers, this rule embodied a
reversal of the existing presumption against applying silent legislation to
tribal nations.55 Nonetheless, the Tuscarora rule was widely cited to
support the application of federal legislation to tribal nations, even if doing
so diminished tribal sovereignty.56
Since Tuscarora, the circuit courts have developed three exceptions to
the rule, generally referred to as the Coeur d’Alene exceptions. In Donovan
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm,57 a case about the applicability of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) to tribal nations, the Ninth
Circuit noted three instances in which the Tuscarora presumption in favor
of application to tribal nations may be reversed.58 The first such exception
is when “the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters.”59 While this exception may seem broad, the Ninth
Circuit construed “purely intramural matters” fairly narrowly as
“conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic
relations.”60 The Ninth Circuit’s reading did not except tribal commercial
activity.61 In a later case upholding ERISA’s preemption of a tribal pension
plan, the same court narrowed the exception to apply “only where the
tribe’s decision-making power is usurped.”62 Similar arguments that
OSHA,63 the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),64 and the Fair Labor
51

Kristen E. Burge, Comment, ERISA and Indian Tribes: Alternative Approaches for Respecting
Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1301.
52
Crawford, supra note 9, at 265.
53
Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116.
54
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
55
See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 456 (2007) (arguing that Tuscarora conflicts with canons of
statutory interpretation).
56
See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(noting the NLRB’s observation that Tuscarora has been applied in several contexts).
57
751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
58
Id. at 1115–16.
59
Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir.
1991).
63
Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996). The court found that
congressional safety regulation of a tribally owned construction business did not impinge upon the
tribe’s right of self-governance in purely intramural affairs because construction is a commercial, rather
than governmental, activity. Id. at 180.
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Standards Act (FLSA)65 fall under this exception have failed. However, the
Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) to tribal nations because it “touches on purely internal matters
related to the tribe’s self-governance.”66
Second, the Tuscarora presumption does not apply when “the
application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by
Indian treaties.”67 Circuit courts have also narrowly construed this
exception. The Seventh Circuit stated “[t]he critical issue is whether
application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the
treaty.”68 The traditional view of treaties with tribal nations considered that
a “treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them.”69 By looking to the treaty for explicit guarantees, the Seventh
Circuit’s construction reversed the traditional view: instead of reading
silences in the treaty to retain tribal rights for the tribe, courts examine the
treaty for express reservations of tribal rights. The absence of such a
reservation is interpreted to mean that the federal government has retained
the right to regulate in that area. If the courts find expressly granted rights
that federal law would abrogate, the legislation cannot be applied to tribal
nations.70
Third, the Tuscarora presumption is reversed when “there is proof by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law]
not to apply to Indians on their reservations.”71 In practice, it may be
difficult to obtain such proof because legislation silent on its applicability
to tribal nations will likely not have legislative history considering the
issue.72 If the legislators had considered the matter, there is a good chance
that the outcome of their deliberations, whatever their inclination, would
find itself into the final legislation.
In sum, the Tuscarora presumption is broad, and its exceptions are
narrow. Once the threshold consideration—the statute’s silence with
respect to its application to tribal nations—is met, the Tuscarora
64

NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the court
noted that the health organization was only partially funded by the tribe, and employed many
individuals who were not tribal members, so the NLRA was applicable. Id. at 1000.
65
Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009). The court found that, because the tribe had not
enacted regulation with respect to wage and hour, it had elected to forgo regulation in this area, and
therefore federal legislation did not impinge on the tribe’s right of self-governance. Id. at 434.
66
EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
67
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
68
Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
69
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (emphasis added).
70
See United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974).
71
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
Crawford, supra note 9, at 267.
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presumption is applied. Only if a statute fits into one of three narrow
exceptions will a court following Tuscarora find that the statute does not
apply to tribal nations.
2.

Traditional Canons of Statutory Construction with Respect to
Tribes.—Although numerous lower court decisions have applied
the Tuscarora rule,73 the Supreme Court has never evaluated it. Juxtaposed
with the Tuscarora precedents is a competing line of cases which invoke
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning traditional canons of statutory
construction.74 Three canons are of particular relevance to navigating the
inquiry into whether a neutral, generally applicable statute, silent as to its
applicability to tribes, is intended to apply to tribal nations.75
The first traditional canon demands that if Congress intends to
abrogate tribal sovereignty, it must clearly express this intent.76 This, in
effect, is a presumption against the applicability of legislation to tribal
nations unless that legislation expressly states that it is to be so applied.77
Notably, this canon directly contradicts the Tuscarora presumption in favor
of applicability to tribal nations.
The second canon of construction from the Supreme Court is that any
ambiguity in a provision of federal legislation must be interpreted in a
manner that benefits the tribes.78 Two considerations acknowledged in
Supreme Court jurisprudence weigh in favor of interpreting legislation this
way. First, there is a disparity in power between the federal government
and tribal nations.79 Application of this canon leads to reading statutes and
provisions to have as little impact as possible on tribal nations.80 Second,
the federal government has trust responsibilities for the tribal nations that it
73

Mainly the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Reich v. Mashantucket Sand &
Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that OSHA was properly applied to a tribally owned
construction company); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d
683, 685 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining that ERISA applied to the pension plans of employees of a
tribally owned sawmill); Smart, 868 F.2d at 935–36 (holding that ERISA applied to a tribal employer
and its tribal employees of a reservation health center).
74
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits generally invoke these canons. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fond du Lac
Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 250–51 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that ADEA does not apply
to employment discrimination within tribal nations); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d
709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding OSHA inapplicable to a tribal business in a tribal nation).
75
See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999); San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
76
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 202; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 72 (1978); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d at 1311.
77
This was the prevailing rule before Tuscarora. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
78
Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
269 (1992); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); Bryan v. Itasca Cnty.,
426 U.S. 373, 390–92 (1976); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174–76 (1973).
79
See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
80
See, e.g., Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 269 (applying the canon to hold that a tax on the
sale of tribal land was not allowed under a county’s excise tax).
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does not have with respect to the states.81 The exact contours of this
responsibility have shifted over time, but generally speaking it imposes a
fiduciary duty on the federal government.82
The final canon of construction dictates that ambiguous legislation
should be interpreted to further current federal policy goals, as indicated by
congressional pronouncements.83 The current federal policy with respect to
tribal nations is to promote self-sufficiency and self-determination, so
ambiguous statutory language should be read in a way to facilitate those
goals.84 This canon cuts against application of general statutes to tribal
nations because self-sufficiency and self-determination suggest that the
tribal nations be governed according to their own statutes, not those of the
federal government. On a smaller scale, the canon suggests that courts
resolve ambiguities within a statute applicable to tribal nations in such a
manner to promote tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination.
The Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of these canons of
statutory construction would suggest they are the preferred approach to the
issue of applicability of federal legislation to tribal nations; especially so
since the Court has yet to endorse the Tuscarora presumption as applied in
circuit courts.85 Whatever the reasons for the Court’s silence regarding
Tuscarora, it has created some doctrinal confusion for lower courts, which
are unsure whether to apply Tuscarora or the Court-endorsed canons of
statutory construction. And this choice is important: Tuscarora cuts against
tribal autonomy, while the canons of statutory construction promote it.
Amidst this doctrinal confusion, it is not surprising that circuit courts
disagreed as to whether ERISA properly applies to tribal nations—at least
until the 2006 amendment clarified Congress’s intent.86

81

E.g., Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
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III. ERISA’S APPLICABILITY TO TRIBAL NATIONS
After ERISA’s enactment in 1974, there was some confusion among
pension plan administrators and courts alike concerning ERISA’s
applicability to tribal nations. As a general matter, whether a federal law is
applicable in tribal nations depends mainly on the evinced intent of
Congress.87 Because ERISA was silent as to its applicability to tribal
nations, the competing case lines discussed supra came to different
conclusions. Prior to 2006, both the Seventh88 and Ninth89 Circuits applied
the Tuscarora rule in holding that ERISA was applicable in tribal nations,
whereas a court in the Eastern District of Washington found that tribal
nations were included in one of ERISA’s exceptions and therefore ERISA
did not apply on tribal reservations.90 In amending ERISA, the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 clarified Congress’s intent to make ERISA
applicable to tribal nations by explicitly excluding tribal governmental
plans from ERISA’s ambit.91 This Part briefly surveys the ERISA
landscape before and after the amendment.
Prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits started with the Tuscarora presumption that Congress intended to
make ERISA applicable in tribal nations and analyzed ERISA’s regulatory
target to determine if any of the Coeur d’Alene exceptions applied. In
Lumber Industry v. Warm Springs,92 the Warm Springs Indian Reservation
passed an ordinance requiring every tribal business enterprise to offer the
same level of benefits and plan flexibility to tribal members as those
members would receive under the tribal plan.93 The tribal lumber mill
stopped making payments to the multi-employer pension plan, as that plan
did not meet the ordinance’s requirements.94 The pension plan sued and lost
in the district court.95
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit primarily focused on the first Tuscarora
exception: whether “the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in
purely intramural matters.”96 The court seemed to narrow the exception,
87

See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 202 (holding that Congress must
evince clear intent to abrogate treaty rights); Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 259 (holding that
Congress in the Burke Act made clear its intent to permit a state to tax Native American land).
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Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989).
89
Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685–86 (9th
Cir. 1991).
90
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Somday, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130–35 (E.D. Wash. 2000).
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120 Stat. at 1051–52 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)).
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939 F.2d 683.
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Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 730 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.
Cal. 1990), rev’d, 939 F.2d 683.
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Id.
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Id. at 329.
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Lumber Indus. Pension Fund, 939 F.2d at 685 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm,
751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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determining that applying ERISA on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation
would not “usurp the tribe’s decision-making power,”97 nor impinge upon
tribal self-government because it did “not encroach on the tribe’s right of
self-governance in passing or enforcing”98 the ordinance’s requirements.
That is, the court thought that ERISA’s funding requirements were a
separate issue that did not impinge upon the tribe’s ability to enact
minimum pension plan benefit requirements. The court then summarily
rejected the remaining two exceptions as inapplicable.99
In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co.,100 decided in 1989, the Seventh
Circuit upheld ERISA’s application to tribal nations, writing, “[a] statute of
general application will not be applied to an Indian Tribe when the statute
threatens the Tribe’s ability to govern its intramural affairs, but not simply
whenever it merely affects self-governance as broadly conceived.”101 It
concluded that applying ERISA did not affect any positive treaty rights and
that it could not find any evidence of congressional intent to exclude tribal
nations from the reach of the statute.102
In 2006, Congress passed the Pension Protection Act, which
substantially amended ERISA. This amendment added to ERISA’s
“governmental plan” definition, discussed supra, explicitly exempting
tribal government pension plans for individuals performing essential
government functions.103 This language served two functions. First, it
exempted certain tribal governmental plans from the reach of ERISA. More
importantly, however, it clarified that Congress originally intended ERISA
to apply to tribal nations.104 If ERISA did not apply to them, there would be
no reason to amend the statute to include the tribal government exception:
such tribal government pension plans would already have been excluded.
This comports with expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the canon of
statutory construction stating that “to express or include one thing implies
the exclusion of the other.”105 Furthermore, if Congress had intended to
prohibit wholesale ERISA’s application in tribal territory, it likely would
have made a straightforward statement to that effect, rather than leaving
ERISA’s exact scope to judicial intuition.
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Id.
99
Id. at 685–86.
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Id. at 935.
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Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051 (2006) (codified as
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To summarize: ERISA appears to generally apply in tribal nations.106
By ERISA’s plain language, it applies to all private employers operating
within tribal nations and offering pension plans, whether or not they
employ tribal members.107 By the Pension Plan Act’s plain language, when
the tribal government or subdivision thereof is the employer, ERISA
applies if not all of its employees are predominantly performing essential
government functions.108 And because Congress has plenary power to
regulate interstate commerce within the nation’s borders, ERISA governs
the pension plans of tribal members working in the United States, outside
the tribal nation.109 Because ERISA will be widely in force in tribal nations,
it is important to determine the extent to which tribal courts can participate
in the important judicial tasks ERISA requires, including issuing maritalasset division orders.
IV. ANALYSIS: WILL ERISA ADMINISTRATORS ACCEPT
TRIBAL COURT DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS?
The relationship between ERISA and tribal nations raises important
questions regarding the ability of tribal courts to serve as the judicial
mediator required by ERISA. In divorce and child support contexts, ERISA
predicates a plan administrator’s action on the administrator receiving an
order “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”110 While this
seems to be a simple phrase, it raises important issues for tribal
sovereignty. Given that a particular set of code is considered state law, it is
unclear whether a particular judicial identity necessarily inheres within that
code. That is, does substantive state law, when applied by an entity not
endowed with the power to interpret that law, retain its identity as state
law? Or are state courts the sole exercisers of state law?
The DOL concluded in an Advisory Opinion that, according to the
definitions in ERISA (as discussed infra), a tribal court is not a state court,
so tribal court orders are not made pursuant to state law, unless the state has
a statute recognizing tribal court orders as being made pursuant to state
law.111 Based on this Advisory Opinion, the DOL directed plan
administrators to not honor the tribal court marital-asset division orders.112
But this conclusion ignored a more plausible interpretation of the ERISA
provisions: if a tribal court has available in tribal code a choice of law
provision allowing the application of state law, and were to import that
state law to divide the marital assets, then the action would have been taken
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
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pursuant to state law as required by ERISA. In that instance, plan
administrators should treat the tribal court order just as they would an order
coming from a state court. Of course, if the tribal nation does not have a
choice of law provision to utilize issuing the division order, then plan
administrators would be more hard-pressed to accept it, and judicial
clarification should be sought.
A. The United States DOL Advisory Opinion
Recently, PNM Resources, an extensive energy holding company
based in Albuquerque, New Mexico,113 requested an advisory opinion from
the United States DOL, inquiring whether ERISA benefit plan
administrators can honor tribal court domestic relations orders for purposes
of ERISA.114 PNM Resources employs approximately 2000 people,115 many
of whom are members of the twenty-two Native American tribes found in
New Mexico.116 Because these tribal members often live in tribal nations
and have access to tribal courts, PNM received draft domestic relations
orders issued by tribal courts.117 PNM, as a corporation that must comply
with ERISA in offering its employee pension benefit plans, sought
guidance from the DOL as to whether it could accept tribal court orders
issued by the Family Court of the Navajo Nation.118
The DOL’s analysis is easily summarized. To begin, the DOL noted
that pension plan benefits generally cannot be assigned or alienated.119
However, there are exceptions to this general rule, including assignments
pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.120 Pension plan providers
must comply with the terms of such an order.121
Continuing its analysis, the DOL noted that a qualified domestic
relations order is defined in ERISA as a domestic relations order “which
creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or
assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the
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Corporate Overview, PNM RESOURCES, http://www.pnmresources.com/corporate/corp
Overview.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *1.
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benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan.”122 A “domestic
relations order,” in turn, is
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which—(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other
dependent of a participant, and (II) is made pursuant to a State domestic
relations law (including a community property law).123

Following the chain of definitions one link further, “State,” as noted
supra, is defined as “any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake
Island, and the Canal Zone.”124 Notably, this definition does not include
tribal nations.
A pension plan administrator, upon receiving a domestic relations
order, must determine whether it is “qualified” pursuant to a State domestic
relations law.125 Up to this point in the analysis, the Advisory Opinion
simply linked the various relevant definitions contained in ERISA.
However, the Opinion went on to append an additional requirement, one
that the DOL explicitly admitted is not found in the statute. It stated that the
qualified domestic relations order made pursuant to state law must be
issued “by a State authority with jurisdiction over such matters.”126 The
DOL justified adding the above clause by reasoning:
A principal purpose of ERISA section 206(d)(3) is to permit the division of
marital property on divorce in accordance with the directions of the State
authority with jurisdiction to achieve an appropriate disposition of property
upon the dissolution of a marriage, as defined under State law. Nothing in
ERISA section 206(d)(3) requires that a domestic relations order be issued by
a State court. Rather, the Department has previously concluded that a division
of marital property in accordance with the proper final order of any State
authority recognized within the State’s jurisdiction as being empowered to
achieve such a division of property pursuant to State domestic relations law
(including community property law) would be considered a “judgment,
decree, or order” for purposes of ERISA section 206(d)(3)(B)(ii).127

Thus, while explicitly noting that ERISA does not require that a
domestic relations order be issued by a state court, it in effect appended
such a requirement because nothing in the Advisory Opinion’s language
actually precludes other sources from being considered a “judgment,
decree, or order.”
122
123
124
125
126
127
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Finally, the DOL noted that certain states have laws addressing
jurisdictional issues with respect to tribal court domestic relations orders.128
For example, an Oregon statute provides, “[a] foreign judgment of a tribal
court . . . filed in a circuit court . . . that . . . [is] a domestic relations order
as defined in 26 U.S.C. 414(p), is a domestic relations order made pursuant
to the domestic relations laws of this state for the purposes of
26 U.S.C. 414(p).”129 In accordance with the DOL’s defining clause, it
reasoned that in states such as Oregon, the tribal courts’ domestic relations
orders would constitute a qualified domestic relations order for purposes of
ERISA, because the state had endorsed the tribal court’s jurisdiction.130
Because New Mexico did not have such a law, the DOL concluded by
stating that it could not conclude that a domestic relations order from the
Family Court of the Navajo Nation would be a domestic relations order that
pension plan administrators could honor under ERISA.131
DOL advisory opinions purport to only evaluate the facts to which
they respond.132 Such opinions are not binding on courts, although they may
be persuasive to the extent that their reasoning is persuasive.133 But the
DOL’s reasoning is not persuasive. This opinion improperly restricted the
source of qualified domestic relations orders, and in so doing, stripped
tribal courts of the power to adjudicate claims for their own members.
While the issue has yet to be heard in state or federal court, once it is, for
the reasons discussed infra the reasoning should be refuted.
B. Weaknesses in the Advisory Opinion
The main problem with the Advisory Opinion is its addition of the
phrase “by a State authority with jurisdiction over such matters.” At first
glance, it may seem like this phrase is an innocuous redundancy that does
not change anything substantive at all, but rather states the obvious: for a
domestic relations order to be valid, it must be issued by a court with the
power to do so. Intuitively, it does not seem controversial to say that a
domestic relations order drawn up by an aspiring amateur attorney would
not qualify as a valid domestic relations order, no matter how closely and
accurately the attorney followed the state law regarding domestic relations.
An examination of the language of ERISA confirms this: section
206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) defines “qualified domestic relations order” as a
domestic relations order “which creates or recognizes the existence of an
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alternate payee’s right to . . . receive . . . benefits.”134 Thus, ERISA says
that one of the requirements for a domestic relations order to be qualified is
that it must create or recognize a right. The term “right” implies that there
must be a legal consequence somewhere to the creation of the domestic
relations order,135 but the statute does not go so far as to specify where
exactly that right must be created.
But the phrase added to the Advisory Opinion does more than simply
prohibit the backroom, amateur attorney from making a living selling
qualified domestic relations orders; it prohibits tribal courts from doing so.
In this way it is worse than redundant: it is overly restrictive because courts
that should have authority to issue qualified domestic relations orders under
the plain language of ERISA are precluded from exercising it. It is a
plausible, natural reading of the statute that any court with proper
jurisdiction over the individuals seeking the domestic relations order may
draw up such an order, pursuant to state law.136
What then is the purpose of the word “recognize” in ERISA? Canons
of statutory interpretation instruct that words should not be construed such
that their inclusion is superfluous.137 The Advisory Opinion opined that a
state must have a statute that explicitly recognizes the validity of tribal
domestic relations orders, thereby bringing them under state law, before
ERISA plan administrators can recognize them. This interpretation follows
this canon of construction, but it is not the only possibility. It seems at least
equally likely that “recognize” was included to allow state laws to
acknowledge the validity of domestic relations orders created pursuant to
tribal domestic relations law,138 or another jurisdiction’s native body of law
(e.g., another state’s law). That is, it imparts to the states the discretion to
recognize a tribal-judiciary-created right as state law that otherwise would
not be state law. Furthermore, this reading of “recognize” avoids the
unnecessarily constrained reading of “create” that the Advisory Opinion
advocates, making it the better interpretation.139
C. What Does It Mean to Be Made Pursuant to State Law?
Even granting that a tribal court may, in some instances, be an
appropriate adjudicatory body, ERISA still requires that a “domestic
134
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relations order” be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”140
The Advisory Opinion correctly asserts that the ERISA definition of
“State” does not include tribal nations.141 It follows that a domestic
relations order created under a tribal nation’s domestic relations law142
would not qualify under ERISA, and would therefore force tribal members
into state court, unless the state explicitly authorizes the contrary. (For
policy reasons, plan administrators should be allowed to recognize
domestic relations orders issued by tribal courts as “qualified” under
ERISA, but this situation will be discussed infra more thoroughly.)
However, many tribal nations’ codes have a choice of law provision
allowing tribal courts to employ state law, as opposed to tribal law, in
appropriate circumstances.143 In such instances, the plain language of
ERISA is satisfied because ERISA only requires that the domestic relations
order be “made pursuant to a State domestic relations law.”144 Thus, when a
tribal court uses state law, the resulting decision is pursuant to state law as
required by ERISA, so ERISA plan administrators should accept these
orders.
A counterargument is that a tribal judicial system’s use of state law via
a choice of law provision is arguably an incorporation of state law into
tribal domestic laws; the law resulting from invoking a choice of law
provision to use state law in effect yields tribal law that mimics the
substance of state law without actually borrowing its identity.145 Under this
reasoning, it could be said that the result of a tribal court’s application of
state law is not a result “pursuant to state law” because the state law ceased
to be state law upon incorporation into the tribal judicial system. But this is
contrary to the normal understanding of choice of law provisions.146 Federal
courts sitting in diversity are not said to be applying federal law; they are
choosing which state law to apply.147 Furthermore, state courts often apply
the laws of other states where substantial portions of the alleged violations
140
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occurred.148 With the understanding that a choice of law provision allows a
jurisdiction to apply the laws of another jurisdiction, the issue becomes
whether a specific statute allows it.
Furthermore, even given that a choice of law provision provides
results pursuant to the loaner state’s laws, there is still the argument that the
tribal court is applying tribal law (by rebranding state law as tribal law), not
state law. But this is of no consequence. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary, “pursuant to” means “[i]n compliance with” or “in accordance
with.”149 The exact identity of the law is less important than is the content
of the law. If the process of decisionmaking and the results of the decision
are the same as they would be in a state court applying state law, then it can
be said that the tribal court’s decision is pursuant to state law.
D. Choice of Law in the Navajo Nation
Tribal courts may or may not have a choice of law provision available
to them. The form varies among those that do. The Navajo Nation is one of
the largest tribal nations in the United States,150 and its choice of law
provision makes for an interesting study because of its complexity. The
Navajo Nation Code151 choice of law provision states:
A. In all cases the courts of the Navajo Nation shall first apply applicable
Navajo Nation statutory laws and regulations to resolve matters in
dispute before the courts. The Courts shall utilize Diné bi
beenahaz’áanii (Navajo Traditional, Customary, Natural or Common
Law) to guide the interpretation of Navajo Nation statutory laws and
regulations. The courts shall also utilize Diné bi beenahaz’áanii
whenever Navajo Nation statutes or regulations are silent on matters
in dispute before the courts.
B. To determine the appropriate utilization and interpretation of Diné bi
beenahaz’áanii, the court shall request, as it deems necessary, advice
from Navajo individuals widely recognized as being knowledgeable
about Diné bi beenahaz’áanii.
C. The courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply federal laws or
regulations as may be applicable.
D. Any matters not addressed by Navajo Nation statutory laws and
regulations, Diné bi beenahaz’áanii or by applicable federal laws and
148

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1981)
(discussing the application of Illinois law in Florida state courts).
149
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1356.
150
Cindy Yurth, Census: Native Count Jumps by 27 Percent, NAVAJO TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012,
available at http://navajotimes.com/news/2012/0112/012612census.php; see Bill Donovan, Census:
Navajo Enrollment Tops 300,000, NAVAJO TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://navajotimes.
com/news/2011/0711/070711census.php.
151
The Navajo Nation Code is analogous to federal statutory law. See MacArthur v. San Juan
Cnty., 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 965 (D. Utah 2005).

730

108:711 (2014)

Tribal Court Domestic Relations Orders

regulations, may be decided according to comity with reference to the
laws of the state in which the matter in dispute may have arisen.152

This choice of law provision is similar to those of other tribal nations
that direct the court to apply the first applicable code provision found from
a list of potentially applicable bodies of law, ordered in descending
preference.153 A Navajo Nation tribal court must first apply Navajo Nation
statutory law, supplemented with Navajo common law, then any applicable
federal law, and finally must reference state laws only if it finds the former
sources lacking.
The relevant question for purposes of ERISA is whether the Navajo
Nation choice of law provision allows tribal courts to issue domestic
relations orders pursuant to state law. The answer is unclear and probably
depends on the tribal court and the framing of the issue. On the one hand,
Navajo Nation common law governs the division of assets upon the
dissolution of a marriage.154 If this is the case, then the Navajo court would
not be allowed to invoke the fourth provision and decide the case in comity
with state laws. Because the order would be based on tribal law, ERISA’s
mandate that the domestic relations order be pursuant to state law would
not be met, and tribal members would be forced into state court to divide
marital assets.
However, a creative and willing tribal court could utilize one of two
ways in which its decision could be made pursuant to state law and
therefore satisfy ERISA. The first way is with respect to the Navajo Nation
common law. Common law is judge-made law. Thus, the court could
exercise its common-law-making power and find that the Navajo Nation
common law, for cases in which the tribal members will be forced to
adjudicate their claims in a foreign court if the Navajo court order does not
comply with ERISA, dictates that the court use state substantive law. Such
an order would then be pursuant to state law and the plain language of
ERISA would be satisfied.
A second approach would require reframing the issue. Because the
Navajo Nation Code mandates referencing state law when Navajo Nation
law does not speak to the issue,155 the court could frame the issue not
simply as a division of marital assets, but more specifically as the division
of marital assets for pension benefit plans governed by ERISA. The Navajo
Nation has neither statutory provisions nor common law doctrine that
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would thus be applicable,156 and the court could reference state law, issue
an order pursuant to it, and again, meet ERISA’s plain-language demands.
Were a Navajo court to employ either of these approaches, the result would
both comply with the directives of the Navajo Nation choice of law
provision and produce a result in accordance with the plain language of
ERISA.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Relevant policy considerations also suggest that tribal nations be
allowed to issue qualified domestic relations orders that can be honored by
ERISA administrators. Even when tribal nations lack a choice of law
provision and therefore do not have the capability to apply state law, tribal
courts should still be able to issue domestic relations orders that will be
honored by ERISA administrators, because so allowing increases tribal
autonomy and continues the tribal courts’ role of safeguarding tribal
customs and understandings, instead of subordinating them to the ideas of
the mainstream American culture and jurisprudence.
A. Increasing Tribal Autonomy
Increasing tribal autonomy is an oft-repeated goal of federal policy.157
This goal is exemplified by, among other things, allowing tribal gaming
ventures.158 These gaming ventures required many employees,159 which led
to competition for employees,160 which likely contributed to these tribal
gaming ventures offering employee benefit plans, including pension
plans.161 The proliferation of these pension plans was a significant factor
contributing to ERISA’s widespread application across tribal nations,
which is—the views of certain courts notwithstanding162—arguably an
156

See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. A search for “ERISA” in Navajo court cases reveals no
relevant authority. Tribal Court Decisions Search Results, PICO SEARCH, http://www.picosearch.com/
cgi-bin/ts.pl?index=130686;query=erisa;SEARCH=Search;opt=ANY (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
157
See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (noting that
an inquiry into the applicability of state bingo regulation is colored by the policy of tribal autonomy);
Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1182–83 (10th
Cir. 2012) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity was an important part of tribal self-determination).
158
See Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d at 1183; William Buffalo & Kevin J.
Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers,
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1995).
159
See Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 158.
160
See Burge, supra note 51, at 1292 n.5 (giving the example of the Potawatomi Bingo Casino
using pension plans to recruit employees).
161
Id. at 1291–92 & n.5.
162
See Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685 (9th
Cir. 1991) (following Tuscarora in finding ERISA applicable to a tribally owned sawmill); see also
Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989) (following Tuscarora in finding
ERISA applicable to tribal health center employees).
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infringement on the autonomy and sovereignty of these tribes. Nonetheless,
ERISA’s current application to tribal nations is fairly established law
because of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amendments to ERISA.163
But ERISA’s regulation of private entities within tribal nations does not
render moot the federal policy of increasing tribal autonomy, nor the
canons of statutory construction repeatedly expounded upon by the
Supreme Court.164 And so the focus of interpretation moves from the macro
to the micro: from the issue of wholesale applicability to how best to
interpret specific provisions of ERISA.
The main problem with not allowing ERISA administrators to honor
tribal courts’ domestic relations orders is that it reduces tribal autonomy.
Tribal courts are not allowed to interface with a statute that affects many of
their tribal members. A tribal member seeking marital-asset division upon
divorce is then forced to go to a state court to obtain a domestic relations
order that an employer will honor. This presents both jurisdictional and
practical problems, both of which function to reduce the role of tribal
courts in shaping the domestic relations of their own tribal members, and,
in so doing, reduces tribal autonomy.
At a general level, different jurisdictional conditions exist between
tribal nations and their host states. In some instances there will be
concurrent jurisdiction, in which case the state court of the state of the
tribal nation has jurisdiction over disputes between Native Americans about
events arising or occurring solely in tribal nations.165 This will not create
jurisdictional difficulties for tribal members seeking division of pension
plans issued by tribe-owned corporations, although it still creates practical
problems. In other instances, however, the tribal court will have exclusive
jurisdiction.166 This means that the tribal member will not be able to obtain
a state court domestic relations order; instead, she will be forced to obtain a
tribal court domestic relations order and hope to have it recognized by the
ERISA plan administrator.
In the first scenario, the tribal member is incentivized to forego tribal
court for state court to ensure that the plan administrator will recognize the
court’s order as “qualified” under ERISA. To the extent that tribal
members seek redress in state court, this approach decreases utilization of
tribal courts, concomitantly reduces tribal court influence over tribal
members and tribal policy, and thereby reduces tribal autonomy as a whole.
In the second instance, the tribal member must find a state court that is
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See Crawford, supra note 9, at 279.
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the canons of construction).
165
See Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public
Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632–35 (1998).
166
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of
state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs . . . .”).
164
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willing and able to certify a domestic relations order from the tribal court,167
which would allow the ERISA administrator to honor it. This creates a
subservient relationship between the two entities, and raises questions
about the type of review the state court will perform.
Practically speaking, not allowing tribal members to utilize tribal
courts to obtain domestic relations orders for purposes of complying with
ERISA means that tribal members are forced to travel to courts to which
they may have no substantial connection (other than that the court happens
to be in the same state as the reservation) and which may be farther from
where they live than their tribal court.168 This makes it unnecessarily
difficult to obtain a domestic relations order that will be honored by ERISA
administrators. Certainly, tribal members who work for private employers
outside of tribal nations can expect to be somewhat accountable for their
activities to the local government of that jurisdiction. However, it seems
grossly unfair to say that, by virtue of working outside the reservation, they
have consented to adjudicating in state court the division of the property
they hold within the tribal nation. Yet this is what the DOL’s current
reading of ERISA mandates. And while it may be said that by participating
in a nontribal pension plan, the tribal member has been given notice of and
consented to state court jurisdiction over marital-asset division, this misses
the point—that tribal members should not be required to seek redress in
state court and that tribal courts should not be stripped of their power to
adjudicate the domestic relations of their own tribal members.
B. Cultural and Historical Expertise
Tribal nations have histories separate from the United States and each
other. They have different creation myths,169 different ways of structuring
domestic relations,170 different values,171 and different understandings of the
167

“Able” meaning the state legislature has endowed the state court to certify tribal court orders.
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 24.115(4) (2011) (“A foreign judgment of a tribal court of a federally
recognized Indian tribe that is filed in a circuit court under this section, and that otherwise complies
with 26 U.S.C. 414(p) as a domestic relations order as defined in 26 U.S.C. 414(p), is a domestic
relations order made pursuant to the domestic relations laws of this state for the purposes of 26 U.S.C.
414(p).”).
168
See AZ Courts Locator, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.azcourts.gov/AZCourts/AZCourts
Locator.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). For a map of the Navajo Nation judicial districts, see
Interactive Map of the Judicial District Courts of the Navajo Nation, JUD. BRANCH NAVAJO NATION,
http://www.navajocourts.org/indexdistct.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2014).
169
See Harold Carey Jr., Navajo Creation Story—The First World “Nihodilhil” (Black World),
NAVAJO PEOPLE CULTURE & HIST. (Mar. 12, 2011), http://navajopeople.org/blog/navajo-creation-storythe-first-world-nihodilhil-black-world/.
170
See Diné Marriage Act of 2005, CAP-29-05 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at http://www.navajo
courts.org/Resolutions/29-05%20Marriage%20Act.pdf (amending Navajo Nation Code title 9 to
prohibit same sex marriage).
171
See Wisdom of the Elders, NAVAJOVALUES.COM, http://www.navajovalues.com/NataniValues/
natani/wisdomofelders.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).

734

108:711 (2014)

Tribal Court Domestic Relations Orders

world.172 These differences create unique obligations among individuals
and varied methods for resolving situations in which these obligations are
not met. Tribal courts are uniquely endowed with the cultural and historical
understanding necessary to resolve these disputes.173 Forcing state courts to
adjudicate according to customs with which they are not familiar is at best
irresponsible,174 and at worst perpetuates the cultural imperialism and
vanishing of Native American traditions that have been ongoing for the last
five hundred years.175 State courts should not issue domestic orders for tribe
members whose cultural norms are unique to Native American history, and
ERISA administrators must be allowed to recognize tribal orders to permit
tribal traditions to continue.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Something needs to change so that tribal courts can issue domestic
relations orders that will be honored by ERISA administrators. Whether
this is accomplished by altering the language of ERISA to include tribal
courts in the definition of entities authorized to issue “qualified” orders or
by judicial interpretation, what is paramount is for tribal nations to enjoy
autonomy in organizing their domestic relations. This Part offers specific
changes that can be made so that tribal courts are able to participate in and
shape the domestic relations of their nations while also protecting the
cultural norms of the people they govern.176
A. Potential Legislative Changes
First, Congress could amend the definitions in ERISA. This can be
done in one of two ways. Congress could simply change the definition of
“domestic relations order” in § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) from “is made pursuant
to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law)”177
to “is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a
community property law or a tribal nation domestic relations law).” This
172

See Navajo Cultural History and Legends, NAVAJOVALUES.COM, http://www.navajovalues.
com/natani/navajovalues.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
173
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (“[I]ssues likely to arise in a civil
context . . . will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may
be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts.”). A similar argument may be made for having
separate courts for the various immigrant groups residing in the United States. However, such a
situation is different from the concerns of federal and state adjudication of tribal relations because the
latter implicates sovereignty concerns.
174
For a discussion of Navajo marital-asset division, see AUSTIN, supra note 154.
175
See, e.g., EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 95–100 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1917) (explaining how the
Portuguese and Spanish divided the non-European world via the Treaty of Tordesillas, with the blessing
of the Pope, in 1494, thereby devaluing indigenous cultures).
176
For a discussion regarding tribal courts shaping domestic relations, see AUSTIN, supra note 154.
177
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2006).
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would explicitly allow tribal nations to apply their own native laws to the
division of marital assets, including pension plans.178
Alternatively, Congress could modify the definition of “state” to
include tribal nations.179 However, this may require a rewording of the
definition of “governmental plan” that the Pension Protection Act of 2006
amended.180 Were “state” redefined to include tribal nations, the current
wording of “governmental plan” would exempt all pension plans of the
tribal nation from ERISA, not solely the pension plans of individuals
employed in pursuit of essential government services.
Expanding the exemption might make sense, especially in light of the
federal government’s policy goal to promote tribal autonomy. Furthermore,
Congress’s original concern when passing ERISA was to protect workers
in private industry from pension plan underfunding.181 But because tribal
governments have the power to tax and to spend,182 the problem of pension
plan underfunding is of little concern, irrespective of whether the
governmental employee is employed in pursuit of essential governmental
services or more traditionally commercial activities, because the tribal
government can raise revenue by raising taxes or cutting spending, thereby
ensuring adequate funding levels.183 This might put tribal nation enterprises
pursuing traditionally commercial activities at an advantage compared to
nontribal private entities, but in the one area where many tribal
governments earn substantial revenue—tribal gaming—this concern is not
an issue.184 Most states do not allow casinos (outside of tribal reservations),
so there is little private party competition, in this industry at least, to
disadvantage.185
There are numerous examples of federal statutes that provide for the
recognition of certain orders across jurisdictional boundaries. For one,
protective orders are to be “accorded full faith and credit by the court of
another State, Indian tribe, or territory . . . and enforced by the court and
178

For example, Navajo common law has two ways of dividing marital assets: equally between the
partners, or everything to the woman. AUSTIN, supra note 154, at 180.
179
§ 1002(10).
180
Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 906(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1051 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(32)).
181
§ 1001.
182
See, e.g., PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION CONST., art. v, § 1.
183
Thus, the rationale behind ERISA’s governmental plan exemption should apply here as well.
For a discussion on the rationale for this exemption, see Rose v. Long Island Railroad Pension Plan,
828 F.2d 910, 913–15 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988).
184
2012 Gaming Revenue Distributed by Region, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION,
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/media/2012%20Gaming%20Revenue%20
Distribution%20by%20Region.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
185
Only seventeen states allow stand-alone non-Indian casinos. Types of Gaming by State, AM.
GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/states-gaming
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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law enforcement personnel of the other State, Indian tribal government or
Territory as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.”186 It would
not be hard to substitute “domestic relations orders” for “protection
order”187 in an analogous statute, and it would be all that is required to
make orders issued by tribal courts “qualified” under ERISA.
Changes can be made on the state level as well to recognize tribal
court domestic relations orders. As the Advisory Opinion noted,188 some
states have laws that expressly provide for state recognition of tribal
domestic relations orders.189 Such statutes basically incorporate the
substance of the tribal court domestic relations order into the laws of the
state. States not having such laws should enact them—Oregon’s statute
described in the Advisory Opinion is a perfect model. However, such a
strategy is by its nature somewhat cumbersome, as each state must
individually pass such legislation.
B. Potential Judicial Changes
However, legislation is not the only path by which tribal courts can be
enabled to participate in the shaping of this particular sphere of domestic
relations within their own tribe. Changes can be made by federal and state
courts as well.190 Federal and state courts can simply interpret “pursuant to
a State domestic relations law”191 to require a particular body of law to be
used to create the domestic relations order, void of any requirement for a
specific adjudicatory body. This has the advantage of allowing courts to
account for the policy benefits gained by allowing tribal courts to
adjudicate the domestic relations of their members with respect to ERISAgoverned pension plans.192 Compared to the legislative route, however, this
possibility has two disadvantages.
First, this strategy requires the tribal nation to have a choice of law
provision. Those that do not cannot take advantage of this language, even
given a willing court. Therefore, tribal nations that do not have choice of
law provisions should enact them. Doing so would give tribal courts more
flexibility and increase their ability to serve as a convenient and familiar
forum in which tribal members can seek redress.
Second, while a choice of law provision opens the tribal court as a
forum for redress for a tribal member with an ERISA-governed pension
plan, it does not allow the tribal court to take into account the unique
cultural norms and values embodied in its own native law. That is, the court
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

18 U.S.C § 2265 (2006) (footnote omitted).
Id.
Department of Labor 2011 Opinion Letter, supra note 8, at *2.
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 24.115(4) (2011).
See supra Part IV.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2006).
See supra Part V.
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simply becomes a convenient forum for the tribal member without actually
being a participant in the development and application of tribal law. The
law applied would be state law, although there may be room at the margins
for the tribal court to imbue the order with the tribe’s own cultural
values.193
Another possible judicial path would entail using the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution194 and the similarly worded
congressional act.195 Such a route would be a bit more circuitous for a tribal
member to navigate, because it would force the tribal member to bring a
tribal court domestic relations order to state court to have it recognized.196
However, it has the upside of allowing the tribal court to apply tribal law
instead of state law to the division of the marital assets, thereby
maintaining the autonomy of the tribal nation.197
The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.”198 Notably lacking from this clause, however, is any
mention of tribal nations. This does not mean that states do not have to
afford full faith and credit to the laws of tribal nations.
Evaluating the analogous congressional act changes the picture. Passed
in 1804,199 the Full Faith and Credit Act is basically a statutory version of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but it includes important variations in
language. The relevant part reads: “Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken.”200 The noteworthy addition to this statute, as compared to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is that it includes “Territories and
193

For example, if state law calls for equitable principles to be used in marital-asset division, it
seems possible that when employed by a tribal court, those equitable principles might incorporate tribal
notions of equality. New York, for example, uses equitable principles to divide marital assets upon
divorce. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2010).
194
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
195
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
196
See id. (providing full faith and credit in “every court within the United States,” meaning that
orders issued by a tribal court should be recognized by state courts, but only if tribal nations are
determined to be a “State, Territory, or Possession of the United States”).
197
For example, Navajo common law allows for the woman to retain all assets accumulated by
either party during marriage upon divorce, while state law generally does not allow this. AUSTIN, supra
note 154, at 180.
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
199
Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006)). The Act was
originally passed in 1790 and the 1804 Act was a slight update. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat.
122 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
200
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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Possessions.” Thus, judicial determinations of the various U.S. territories
and possessions enjoy judicial recognition in all other U.S. states,
territories, and possessions. The important question becomes, then, whether
the various tribal nations are either territories or possessions for the purpose
of this statute. While some disagreement exists about this topic,201 there is a
strong argument that they are one of the two.202
Craig Smith, in his article Full Faith and Credit in CrossJurisdictional Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions Revisited, argues that
tribal nations constitute territories under the Act.203 To Smith, the important
question is not whether Congress, at the time of passing the Act, thought
tribal nations to be territories of the United States, but rather, had Congress
been aware of the current status of tribal nations today, would it think of
them as territories or possessions?204 To Smith, the response is clearly
yes.205 He argues that because tribal nations are territories under this act,
tribal courts are clearly entitled to have the outcome of their judicial
proceedings honored in state courts.206 Thus, tribal members would need to
obtain a tribal domestic relations order, which would need to be recognized
by a state court, before potentially being honorable under ERISA.207
Even if one accepts Smith’s argument, the Act merely states that tribal
domestic relations orders must be given full faith and credit in state courts.
That is, they must be enforceable in state courts. But is this the same as
saying that they, in effect, are transformed into state law, as would be
required under ERISA in order for pension plan administrators to honor
them? On the one hand, it does not seem as though the tribal domestic
relations orders are made pursuant to state law simply by virtue of being
recognized as a valid order by a state court. Under this reading, pension
plan administrators would not be required, or perhaps not even allowed, to
honor the tribal court domestic relations orders.
On the other hand, because the Full Faith and Credit Act requires that
states and territories honor valid orders originating in other states or
territories, it seems paradoxical to say that pension plan administrators
cannot honor these orders but that state courts must honor them by the
terms of the Act. Furthermore, if the state court finds that the orders are
valid and tells the pension plan administrator to fulfill the terms of the
201

See Craig Smith, Comment, Full Faith and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition of Tribal
Court Decisions Revisited, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2010).
202
See generally id. (arguing that tribal nations should be thought of as territories in the context of
the Full Faith and Credit Act).
203
Id. at 1435.
204
Id. at 1395.
205
Id. at 1396. He analogizes from the unique status of Puerto Rico as explored in Cordova &
Simonpietri Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981). See
Smith, supra note 201, at 1426–27.
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See id. at 1428, 1431, 1434–35.
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See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
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domestic relations order, the administrator will be put in the position of
either complying with the state court or with ERISA, which tells the
administrator to alienate only the assets in employee benefit plans based on
qualified domestic relations orders made pursuant to state law. The
uncertainty surrounding the route a divorcing tribal member must travel in
order to get a tribal court’s asset division order fulfilled suggests that this
method is not the ideal way to apply ERISA to Native American tribes.
However, this convoluted path may be necessary unless Congress amends
ERISA.
CONCLUSION
The application of federal statutes to tribal nations, when those statutes
are silent on the issue, is a confused area of law in need of clarification.
However, before clarification can be made, conceptual questions need to be
answered. Chief among these is the exact relationship between tribal
nations and the United States. Courts and the elected branches of
government like to assert the independence and subordination of tribal
nations simultaneously.208 The time has come for such fictions and
sweeping generalizations209 to be set aside in favor of theoretical clarity. In
determining whether ERISA applies to tribal nations, courts have come to
agree that congressional intent, not prior treaties or vague platitudes about
sovereignty, is paramount. And because Congress’s evinced intent was that
ERISA should apply to tribal nations, it has been applied in this manner.
Slowly, tribal nations are becoming yet another subfederal government.210
By writing into law that qualified domestic relations orders must be
made pursuant to state law, Congress infringed upon tribal court autonomy,
placed state courts in the unenviable position of applying their own values
and cultural background to people who do not share them, and forced tribal
members to subject themselves yet again to the will of a foreign sovereign.
There are various fixes to this problem—some simple, some
convoluted. The simplest fix would be for Congress to amend the definition
of domestic relations orders in ERISA so that they can be made pursuant to
either tribal law or state law.
However, in the absence of congressional action, there are more
convoluted workarounds. For tribal nations that have a choice of law
provision, the tribal courts should invoke this provision and utilize state
law to draw up their domestic relations orders. Courts should recognize that
these orders were drawn up pursuant to state law (and the DOL should
revise its Opinion to acknowledge this as well) as the ERISA language
208

See, e.g., Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
See id.
210
See id. (noting that “Indian tribes possess only a limited sovereignty that is subject to complete
defeasance”).
209
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mandates and allow employee benefit plan administrators to honor them.
Tribal nations that do not have choice of law provisions should enact them.
While the tribal courts will not be able to apply their own laws, they at least
will be able to provide their members with a convenient and familiar forum
in which to adjudicate their claims.
States should pass laws recognizing tribal orders, not just as
enforceable under state law, but specifically as part of state law. This will
allow pension plan administrators to honor these tribal court orders. It will
also permit the tribal courts both to be convenient fora for their members
and to apply substantive tribal law.
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